Hollinger Corp. 
pH8.5 



GERMANY'S 
HOLY WAR 

AND OTHER ARTICLES 



BY 



ALBERT SAUVEUR 



CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 
1915 



3^ ^ 



GERMANY'S HOLY WAR.* 



Germany's bid for America's sympathy on the ground that she 
is conducting a holy war to protect herself and the rest of Europe 
from falling under Muscovite domination will not appeal to the 
intelligent, clear-minded American. 

It would be a calamity indeed for the whole world if Europe 
were to be ruled by the Slav, but it would likewise be a calamity 
should the Teuton become her master. The imminent danger to- 
day is not the rule of the Romanoffs, but that of the Hohenzollerns. 
The present war is not, as the German Chancellor would have 
it thought, a " life-and-death struggle between Germany and the 
Muscovite races of Russia," but obviously a life-and-death struggle 
between democracy and German militarism. This is why the 
sympathy of the majority of the American people must necessarily 
be with Germany's opponents. The present coalition is not directed 
against the German people and German civilization — no more than 
the coalition that put an end to the power of Napoleon the First 
was directed against the French people and French civilization; 
it is directed against the rule of might represented by German 
militarism. 

It is obvious that Germany's supreme desire in the present 
struggle is not the warding off of Slavic rule, — that is only incidental, 
— but the bringing of Europe under her own rule. Hence the 
present alignment of Powers against her. Her eagerness to crush 
France is not stimulated by her desire to save the latter country 
from Muscovite domination, but rather by her wish to increase her 
own power at the expense of her neighbors. Her evident intention 
to annex Belgium, should she be victorious, is not directed against 
the Slavs, but aims solely at her own aggrandizement. 

The world also realizes that Germany has played the part of 
a bully among European nations, — a part which is never popu- 
lar, and not without danger, for the hour of reckoning generally 
comes, and when it does come, the bully is likely to find himself 
without friends. The invasion of Belgium was a brutal mani- 
festation of Germany's belief that might makes right. And when 
thus breaking her pledge guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, 

*A letter published in The Nation, September 3, 1914. 

3 



she asked the EngHsh nation to take her word that after the war 
she would restore the independence of that country. The perjurer 
in the act of perjuring asking to be trusted ! It is Uttle wonder that 
the statement was received with merriment by the English Parlia- 
ment. 

It remains to be seen how far the German nation will be willing 
to go with the sacrifice of her children in order, not to save the 
fatherland, but the Hohenzollern dynasty. There is nothing 
fantastic in the thought that before the end of the war the German 
monarchy may tumble down. 

A German victory in the present struggle would mean primarily 
a tremendous setback to democratic principles and the triumph of 
militarism; it would imply the crushing of France and of French 
civilization and the weakening of the power of England, if not the 
reduction of that country to the rank of a second-rate nation. The 
victory of the Allies, on the contrary, would probably be a death- 
blow to militarism and all the evils it implies, and might mark the 
dawn of the era of peace and good-will among nations for which 
the world has so long waited, and towards which bleeding humanity 
is stretching imploring arms. 

Bailey Island, Me., August 22. 



REPLY TO PROFESSOR FRANCKE.* 

In your issue of August 23, 1914, you publish an article by 
Prof. Kuno Francke in which he discusses " the underlying causes 
that forced the hand of the Kaiser." I hope you will permit me to 
reply briefly through your columns to some of his contentions. 

Professor Francke writes that it is easy to see why American 
public opinion should have condemned by an overwhelming ma- 
jority the diplomats of Austria and Germany, but that he believes 
that on looking beyond the immediate occasion of the world's 
conflict the thoughtful observer will find that fundamental justice 
is on the German side. 

Such statement should not be allowed to pass unchallenged. 
In defense of his contention Professor Francke claims that Germany 
was forced into this war (i) because of France's desire to recover 
the provinces she lost in 1870, (2) because of England's jealousy of 

* A letter published in the Boston Herald, August 27, 1914. 



Germany's commercial and industrial prosperity, and (3) because 
of Russia's hatred of Germany. 

What is the validity of these claims? It is undoubtedly true 
that France has never ceased to mourn the loss of a part of her 
territory and to hope for the day when it might be restored to her. 
Does not so natural a feeling entitle her to the respect rather than 
to the blame of any man, regardless of his nationality, who is a 
lover of his country? In spite of the existence of that most excusable 
sentiment, it must be obvious to the unbiased and intelligent 
observer that she did not want war with Germany, that for many 
years she has done her utmost to preserve the peace of Europe, 
at times accepting humiliation in order to avoid a conflict with 
Germany. 

Professor Francke writes: "Germany's policy toward France 
during these forty-three years has been one of utmost restraint 
and forbearance and has been dictated by the one desire of making 
her forget the loss of the two provinces." One is tempted to ask 
whether Professor Francke intended to be facetious when he made 
such statement. Every Franco-German incident which has occurred 
since the war of 1870 is a refutation of Professor Francke's claim 
of German friendly attitude. That Germany has ever been ready, 
on the contrary, to stab France whenever possible to do so with 
reasonable safety and without arousing the indignation of civilized 
nations must be obvious to the student of history. As a matter of 
fact, has not Germany played toward France the part of a bully? 

The Franco-German relations since the war of 1870 have been 
so accurately and clearly outlined in the Springfield Republican 
for August 22 that I cannot help wishing that that editorial might 
be reproduced in your columns, as therein will be found a convincing 
answer to Professor Francke's contention of Germany's friendly 
attitude. As pointed out in that editorial, Bismarck's first concern 
after the Franco-Prussian war was to keep France weak and isolated. 
In 1875 he was planning to attack her again on the ground that she 
had not been sufficiently demolished four years before, intending this 
time to " bleed France white," to use his own brutal words. And 
it was chiefly through the intervention of Russia that France 
escaped this appalling calamity. 

Russia and England were now alarmed, and their fears paved 
the way first for the Franco- Russian alliance and later for the Triple 
Entente, essentially defensive agreements intended for mutual 
protection against the growing and despotic ambition of Germany. 
The Morocco incident in 1905, which led to the humiliation of 



France through her dismissal of Delcasse, at the time her Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, at the dictate of Germany, is an edifying instance 
of Germany's good- will and proves France's earnest desire to main- 
tain peace. Again in 191 1, when Germany, taking advantage of an 
apparent weakness in the Triple Entente, sent a warship to Agadir, 
war was only avoided through the firmness of England's attitude. 
Who is there that would doubt that notwithstanding the generous 
feelings of Germany towards France now claimed by Professor 
Francke to have existed for the last forty- three years, France as a 
world's power would have ceased to exist long ago if Germany could 
have had her own way? 

Professor Francke speaks of the benevolent rule of Germany in 
Alsace-Lorraine. Again it is difficult to believe that he is serious. 
The Zabern incident to which he refers is a good instance of the 
benevolence of the German domination in Alsace-Lorraine. We 
are told that these two French provinces had been German until 
the seventeenth century, but is not the essential point the fact that 
when torn away from France they were inhabited by Frenchmen 
whose patriotism and love for France was not excelled by the 
feelings of the inhabitants of any other portion of the French 
republic, and that after forty-three years of Germanic rule their 
supreme desire is to become once more French citizens? 

Professor Francke refers to the recent military law requiring 
every Frenchman to serve three years instead of two in the active 
army, and considers it as equivalent to mobilization, and as an 
evident indication that France was getting ready to strike at 
Germany. That view is certainly extraordinary when one realizes 
that even after this tremendous sacrifice on the part of France her 
army still remained numerically inferior to that of Germany; that 
the sacrifice was imposed upon her because of the ever-increasing 
size of the German army, due primarily to Germany's increasing 
population, while her own remained nearly stationary. Professor 
Francke might as well contend that France's maintenance of any 
army at all was a proof of evil intentions against Germany. 

We are told that the war was further forced upon Germany 
because of England's jealousy of the commercial growth and pros- 
perity of Germany. Commercial rivalry between nations is not to 
be denied, nor is it to be found fault with. That England should like 
a larger share of the world's commerce, even at the expense of 
Germany's share, can readily be conceded. But it does not follow 
that England was ready to plunge Europe into this terrible war in 
order to satisfy her commercial cravings. Indeed, her conduct, as 



well as that of France, since the Triple Entente came into existence, 
has clearly demonstrated that, like France, she was most anxious 
to preserve peace. 

When everything has been said and discounted I believe that 
American sympathy will remain with Germany's opponents because 
of the following basic considerations : 

(i) When Austria sent an ultimatum to Servia it was so 
worded that she knew it could not be complied with. 

(2) Even after Servia had accepted Austria's ultimatum 
with the single exception of the most offensive clause, which she 
proposed to submit to arbitration, Austria proclaimed herself 
unsatisfied and immediately declared war on Servia. 

(3) Austria in her diplomatic moves with Servia undoubtedly 
had the support of Germany. 

(4) Germany and Austria knew that a war with Servia meant 
a war with Russia. 

(5) Germany and Austria knew that a war with Russia 
meant a general European conflagration. 

(6) In spite of Professor Francke's contention that the 
violation of Belgium's neutrality was a necessity, the world will 
continue to regard it as a brutal manifestation of Germany's belief 
that might makes right. 

(7) The present struggle is not, as the German Chancellor 
would have it, "a life-and-death struggle between Germany and the 
Muscovite races of Russia," but obviously a life-and-death struggle 
between militarism and its evils as represented by the Hohenzollern 
dynasty and democracy as represented by England and France. 

Cambridge, August 25. 



GERMANY'S CLAIMS VERSUS HER AIMS.* 

German professors and editors and other German sympathizers 
in the present struggle of nations have attempted the difficult task 
of convincing the American public, first, that Germany was not 
the aggressor, and, second, that she is conducting a war of civiliza- 
tion directed primarily against Russia that Europe may not fall 
under Muscovite domination. The German Chancellor has made 
similar claims, while in the German " White Paper," published in 
full in the New York Times for August 24, it is likewise attempted 
to fasten the responsibility for this war on Germany's opponents. 

*A letter published in the New York Times, September 5, 1914. 

7 



A close and impartial study of both the English and German 
" White Papers " must suffice to convince the reader that Germany 
clearly was the aggressor and that England made every possible 
effort first to prevent a war between Austria and Servia and later 
to localize the conflict. Germany, on the contrary, by insisting from 
the start that there should be no intervention in the settlement of 
the dispute between Servia and her ally, Austria, made a European 
war inevitable. The sophistry, inaccuracies, and unwarranted 
conclusions of the German professors and editors have not helped 
their cause. The irrefutable facts remain, first, that Austria with 
the knowledge and approval of Germany presented to Servia an 
ultimatum so worded that she knew that the conditions imposed 
could not be complied with by any nation retaining a spark of self- 
respect; second, that after Servia had accepted Austria's ultimatum 
with the single exception of the most offensive clause, which she 
proposed to submit to arbitration, Austria, with Germany's consent, 
proclaimed herself unsatisfied and immediately declared war on 
Servia; third, that Germany and Austria knew that a war with 
Servia meant a war with Russia, and that a war with Russia meant 
a general European conflagration; fourth, that Germany declared war 
on Russia, started the invasion of France before declaring war, and 
by refusing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, to which she was 
solemnly pledged, forced both Belgium and England into the war. 
In the face of so flagrant a violation of all sentiments making for 
peace, no sophistry will avail in attempting to protect Germany 
from the odium of being responsible for the greatest calamity the 
civilized world has ever seen. 

We are told that Germany is conducting this war in the interest 
of civilization, — that her chief purpose is to protect Europe from 
the domination of the Slav. And to ward off this Muscovite danger 
Germany is at present making desperate efforts to crush England 
and France, the standard-bearers of democracy in Europe! In her 
war for civilization she is employing the methods of barbarian 
tribes, methods condemned by civilized nations and which have 
already horrified the world. It is hardly conceivable that Russia, 
which the German Chancellor describes as a semi-Asiatic, slightly 
cultured barbaric nation, could have committed in Belgium the 
atrocities imputed to the Germans had she conquered that country 
in similar circumstances. 

It is manifest that Germany's supreme desire is to fasten 
Teutonic rule on Europe, to crush Russia, to be sure, but also 
to crush France and French civilization and to reduce England to 

8 



the rank of a second-class nation. It is obvious that this is a struggle 
between militarism and its evils as represented by the Hohenzollern 
dynasty and democracy as represented by England and France. 

Cambridge, Mass., September 5, 1914. 



GERMANY'S DOINGS.* 

In the November issue of the Harvard Monthly several pages 
were devoted to an exposition of " Germany's hope." I may, I 
think, be permitted to express the belief that the world is not at the 
present time greatly interested in Germany's hope; it is with her 
doings that it is chiefly concerned. 

Germany stands before the neutral nations soaked in the 
blood of an innocent and peaceful people, and, so long as that is her 
garb, it is incongruous for her to appear as a suppliant for a hearing 
that she may explain to her less cultured sisters some of her philo- 
sophical systems. Many pertinent questions must be answered 
before the world, and especially the people of the United States, will 
be in a mood to listen to her, and in answering them sophistry 
will not be tolerated. Her answers must not be such as to be 
intelligible only to those who have been trained in German kultur. 
One of these questions is so vital that it seems futile to proceed 
with Germany's case until it has been satisfactorily answered. If 
it cannot be done, the prosecution may rest and the verdict must 
necessarily be one of Guilty. It is to that one " incident " only, and 
closely related ones, that I desire to allude. What is Germany doing 
in Belgium? Why did she ever invade that country? Why did she 
conduct a war of atrocities with the evident intention of terrorizing 
the inhabitants of that unfortunate land? Why did she destroy 
her cities and works of art? Why did she drop bombs among non- 
combatants? Why did she levy enormous war taxes? Why did she 
take possession of the food supply? Why, having devastated the 
country and reduced the inhabitants to famine, does she refuse to 
feed them notwithstanding her claim that they are now German 
subjects? 

If we turn to the mass of writing that the defenders of Ger- 
many's conduct have contributed to the daily press, and to the 
counters of booksellers, we discover that they would justify Ger- 
many's invasion of Belgium on the ground of military necessity, 

♦Not previously published. 

9 



made all the more imperious because of the intention of the French, 
known to Germany, of violating Belgium's neutrality. The theory 
that to deal a more direct and quicker blow to your enemy you are 
justified in knocking down and trampling upon any innocent by- 
stander happening to be in your way is so odious as to call for 
universal condemnation, and it has been universally condemned. 
Germany's conduct has been that of a bully brutally assaulting 
a child whom he had sworn to protect. As for France's alleged 
intention of invading Belgium in spite of having given her word to 
England that she would respect the neutrality of that country, as a 
mere expression of opinion from German advocates it carries ab- 
solutely no weight. If Germany could prove that if she had not 
•committed the crime of which she is convicted, France would have 
committed it, it would not exonerate her, but it certainly would 
be an attenuating circumstance. The only possible construction, 
however, that can be placed on Germany's failure to prove her 
contention is that proofs, or even circumstantial evidences, do not 
exist. 

Germany's guilt has been correctly stated in the Providence 
Journal for October 14, 1914, the concluding paragraph of which 
reads as follows: 

"All the tramping of Germany's legions, all the thunder of 
her bombs and batteries, cannot drown out the cry of one little 
Belgian child." 

Has not the time arrived when the neutral nations should unite 
in the name of humanity to rescue an innocent people from the 
clutch of the vulture holding it? 

Cambridge, Mass., November 25, 1914. 



THE EUROPEAN WAR.* 

If this assembly were a court of justice seated to hear Germany's 
case and I the prosecuting attorney, I should rest; I should not 
consider an argument necessary, feeling certain that the verdict 
must be one of Guilty, so satisfactorily has the defense done the 
work of the prosecution. Every word uttered by German sym- 
pathizers, every line written by them in support of their cause, 
has strengthened the belief of an outraged world in Germany's 

*An address before the Massachusetts Schoolmaster's Club, Hotel Bellevue, Boston, 
December 12, 1914. 

10 



culpability. If her apologists had remained silent, her position 
would be to-day less hopeless than it is. Their defense of the 
Fatherland has been based on conclusions drawn from false premises, 
on historical and other inaccuracies, but above all on sophistry. 
Theirs has been the attitude of pedagogues instructing mentally 
deficient children; in addressing the American public they have 
assumed that their audiences were lacking in intelligence and ig- 
norant of the basic facts and incidents that led to the war. And it 
would seem as if those who should be best qualified by education 
and training to defend their country have been the chief offenders 
against accuracy, logic, and tact. 

A few weeks ago a letter I had sent to the editor of a well- 
known New England magazine was returned to me with the state- 
ment that the American public was not interested in a defense of 
the Ten Commandments. That, gentlemen, expresses, I believe, 
the view of a great majority of the American people. The cause 
of the Allies is so obviously a just one that it needs no defense. 
A simple consideration of the events that immediately preceded 
the war and the information contained in the " White Papers " 
suffices to carry conviction. 

When an horrified world, fully realizing the magnitude of the 
catastrophe, heard that a European war had started, its first in- 
quiry was as to the nation or nations responsible for the con- 
flagration. It soon became apparent that Germany, standing 
back of Austria, had committed the infamous deed. The " White 
Papers " uncovered her in the very act of cold-bloodedly lighting 
the blaze — actually hastening to war lest the other nations should 
find a way to prevent it. 

At first there was an attempt on Germany's part to shift the 
blame on her enemies, claiming that they, and not she, had actually 
started the war. That was her first line of defense. How can 
any one believe, asked Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, that Germany 
could be so mad as to plunge into a war against Russia, France, 
England, and Belgium and in face of the moral hostility of the rest 
of the world? Our answer is that we do not believe anything of 
the kind. We believe Germany to be war mad, but not so com- 
pletely as to wilfully enter into such a desperate venture. We 
believe that she started the war because she counted upon the 
moral support, at least, of her ally, Italy; because she expected 
England to remain neutral and Belgium to permit the passage of 
her armies. It was to be a struggle of the triple alliance, or, at 
least, of Germany and Austria against Russia and France. We 

II 



believe that had she known what the attitude ot Italy, Belgium, 
and England would be she would have postponed her aggression. 
Her hatred of England, so loudly proclaimed, is obviously due 
to the part taken by that country in causing Germany's plans 
to miscarry. 

That France did not want war is now conceded by the Germans 
themselves, while we have conclusive evidences that Russia ap- 
proved every move suggested for the maintenance of peace and 
joined with her allies in their strenuous efforts to that end. 

As to the claim that England started the war, it is not to be 
seriously entertained. The attention of England was at that time 
chiefly concerned with sports and with brewing Irish troubles, and 
her hopeless lack of preparations for war is the best proof riot only 
that she had no aggressive intentions, but that she did not expect 
to be drawn into any war. In the face of that unpreparedness, 
scorned at by the Germans themselves, and for which England is 
now paying such heavy penalty, it is inconceivable that German 
sympathizers should have carried mental stupidity to the point 
of claiming that England was the aggressor. But if England had 
failed to take arms against Germany after her violation of Belgium, 
and if Germany had succeeded in defeating both Russia and France, 
as she felt confident she could do, the sequence of Germany's game 
was easy to foretell. With France and Russia crushed, Belgium 
and the French colonies annexed, Germany's mastery of Europe 
would have been such that England undoubtedly would have been 
the monster's next victim. At last " Der Tag "! And who will 
doubt that in due time. South America, the Monroe doctrine, and 
the United States would have received Germany's attention. 

And we now come to Germany's second line of defense. Forced 
to admit that she had started the conflagration, she attempted to 
justify her conduct: (i) because Russia was unwilling to permit 
Austria to deal with Servia as she pleased; (2) because of France's 
unwilHngness to desert her ally, Russia, in case the latter was 
attacked by Germany and Austria; (3) because of England's 
refusing to overlook Germany's criminal invasion of Belgium and 
her obvious evil intentions after the crushing of France and Russia ; 
and (4) because of Belgium's unwise course in opposing the viola- 
tion of her territory. In short, if Russia, France, and England 
had been willing to surrender in abject submission to Germany's 
dictates there would have been no war. As for Germany's reason- 
ing in regard to Belgium, it is as if a man having burned another 
man's house attempted to throw the blame upon him on the ground 

12 



that had he surrendered his house, there would have been no need 
of burning it. 

Germany's third line of defense is found in the claims that 
she started the conflagration in August, 1914, because of her con- 
viction that her enemies of the Triple Entente intended to attack 
her a little later, — " in possibly a year," we are told by Professor 
Muensterberg, — at a time when they would have been in a better 
position to defeat her. She had to ward off their blow by striking 
first. Mere assertion on the part of German advocates of the 
existence of such plot carries with it little weight. The world 
wants proofs or at least strong circumstantial evidences in support 
of the contention. But neither proofs nor evidences can be given, 
because they are non-existent. The world does not believe that 
the members of the Triple Alliance either separately or collectively 
had any desire of precipitating a war with Germany, their conduct 
having always been consistent with a desire for peace, as proven 
by so many historical incidents of the last twenty years. And 
here again England's utter unpreparedness for war is conclusive 
proof that she had no intention of attacking Germany in a year 
or in ten. 

Having failed in her various attempts at placing on the 
shoulders of her enemies the responsibility for the war, Germany 
endeavors to enlist the sympathy of neutral nations, and especially 
of the United States, on the ground that she is fighting for civiliza- 
tion and to ward off Muscovite domination, — as colossal a piece 
of impudence or of stupidity as the world has ever known; an 
insult, in fact, to the intelligence of those she would like to convince. 
Behold Germany, her satellite, Austria, and her new ally, Turkey, 
fighting for civilization against England and France, the standard 
bearers in Europe of democracy and personal liberty! Behold 
also the methods used by the German armies in their defense of 
civilization ! 

Finally we are told that the world should condone Germany's 
conduct because of her proficiency in governmental and municipal 
administration, because of the excellence of her schools and uni- 
versities, because of her ability to manufacture more cheaply than 
other nations certain useful chemical products, because, also, 
Beethoven, Goethe, and even Dante, it seems, were Germans. It 
is as if a criminal was pleading not only for acquittal, but also for 
the indictment of the prosecution, on the ground that he had a 
well-ordered house, that he was a skilled artisan, and that some of 
his ancestors had distinguished themselves. 

13 



With her flimsy defense shattered, and having failed in her 
plea for sympathy, Germany stands before the world convicted of 
having committed with malice aforethought one of the greatest 
crimes recorded in the history of civilized nations, actuated by her 
lust of empire, by her odious theory that might makes right, and 
by an insane belief that she is a superior race entrusted with the 
mission of conquering the world and of forcibly feeding German 
kultur to every nation on Christendom. At first it would seem 
as if but one man, or at least a small group of men, could be the 
victim oi such obsession, but it is now apparent that the whole 
German nation is infected. 

Although acknowledging that the invasion of Belgium was a 
criminal deed, the German chancellor attempted to justify it on the 
ground of military necessity. As this did not appeal to the neutral 
nations, it was then claimed that the Germans were forced to invade 
the country because of their knowledge that England and France 
intended a similar invasion, a statement so obviously contrary to 
facts that it was nowhere seriously entertained. It was then 
contended that documents had been discovered (after the com- 
mission of the crime, however) proving that an understanding 
existed between Belgium and England by which the latter country 
was to be permitted to land troops in Belgium. The documents as a 
matter of fact and of history related only to unofiticial exchanges 
of view in regard to the military assistance that England could 
render in case Germany invaded Belgium. After the untold suffer- 
ings inflicted upon innocent and heroic Belgium by the German 
armies, this attempt at robbing her of her last asset, namely, her 
honor, has been universally condemned. Remember, Belgium will 
long remain the watchword of the nations in their dealings with 
Germany. 

France, we are told, is responsible for the war because she allied 
herself with Russia and because of her desire to recover her lost^ 
provinces, Alsace and Lorraine. The alliance with Russia was, of 
course, essential to the very existence of France. Had it not been 
consummated, France as one of the great powers would have 
ceased to exist long ago ; Germany would have completed her work 
of 1870; France would have been " bled white, " to use Bismarck's 
gentle words. As for France's longing for the return of her lost 
territory, although the Germans generally describe it as a mad 
thirst for revenge, the sentiment is excusable, to say the least. The 
world, moreover, knows that in spite of its existence, France did 
not intend to provoke a war with Germany; indeed, she has given 

14 



in the last twenty years many proofs of her intense desire to live in 
peace with Germany, and that, in the face of distressing Teutonic 
provocations. 

For France this war is like fighting a pestilence, the Huns of the 
twentieth century, who, like birds of prey, have alighted on her 
beautiful and sacred soil. Against that danger she has risen like 
one man, conscious of the justice of her cause, conscious of her 
mission and of her duty to mankind; once again she is unselfishly 
shedding her blood that the cause of personal liberty may triumph. 
For forty years France has lived in the shadow of the lifted club — 
the odious Teutonic menace — with full realization that the blow 
was likely to fall at any moment. And still she lived in that shadow, 
serene, dignified, uncomplaining, outwardly smiling, determined 
that, true to her traditions and ideals, if the blow was to crush her, 
her last gesture would not be a repulsive one. Forty years of de- 
cadence, we are told by the Germans, and well they might have 
been had not France been the possessor of a noble and immortal 
soul. Forty years of decadence, during which France recovered so 
quickly from the disasters of 1870 that Germany, becoming alarmed, 
was anxious five years later to stab her anew, the intervention of 
Russia only preventing her. Forty years of decadence, during 
which France paid promptly the enormous war indemnity demanded 
by Germany and became one of the rich nations of Europe, the 
banker of other nations. Forty years of decadence, during which 
she reconstructed her army with so much success that millions of 
decadent French soldiers drove back from the very walls of Paris 
an equal or greater number of Germans, the pick of the German 
army, and have more than held them ever since. Forty years of 
decadence, during which France gave the world Pasteur, the greatest 
of scientists and public benefactors: Rodin, the greatest living 
sculptor; Rostand, the immortal poet; Berthelot, the great chemist; 
Bergson, the philosopher; Joffre, the invincible. Even in music the 
French school of to-day is conspicuously in the lead. It may be 
assumed that the Nobel prizes are awarded with the strictest 
impartiality by a competent body of men and that the awards 
may, therefore, be regarded as a fair test of the productions of the 
various nations in the fields they cover. Since their creation 
eighteen prizes have been given to " kultured " Germans and eighteen 
to decadent Frenchmen. In other words, decadent France, with a 
population but a little more than one half that of " kultured " Ger- 
many, has received the same number of awards. France is still the 
arbiter of good taste in matters of decoration, personal, municipal, 

15 



and national. French culture stands for intellectual attainments 
and a discriminating appreciation of the beautiful in its various 
manifestations. German kultur deals largely with the material 
sides of life. The French mind is still the temple of reason and of 
clear thinking and the French language still the admirable and 
unequaled means of expressing with lucidity the most delicate 
thoughts of the human mind. French playwrights more than those 
of any other nation still supply the needs of the theater, while in 
foreign countries the demand for French literature is greater than 
that for any other literature. Inspired by the basic work of the 
Wright brothers, has not France done more for aviation than any 
other country? Has she not been a leader also in the successful 
development of the automobile? Even in the manufacture of 
Germany's own specialties, namely, appliances for the destruction 
of human life, France has been a successful competitor, as the Ger- 
mans have now learned from the performance of her seventy-five 
millimeter guns. France is to-day as much as it ever was the Mecca 
of lovers of the beautiful. French thought means as much to the 
world as it ever did. The saying is as true to-day as it ever was that 
every man has two countries, his own and France. 

I believe that the world has for France an affection in which 
tenderness is uppermost, an affection not unlike that of a lover, 
because France is the most human of nations. More than others 
it personifies humanity — with its weaknesses and many failings, 
but also with its noblest impulses and noblest deeds; with its 
sufferings and purest joys. 



AN OFFICIAL PROTEST 
Urged against German Acts in Belgium.* 

In " A Word with Our English Friends " you contend that the 
English should be satisfied with an expression of sympathy for 
their cause on the part of the American people; that it is unreason- 
able to expect more ; that for the American government to protest 
against the criminal deeds of Germany would do more harm than 
good; that The Hague conventions, because they were not ratified 
by all the belligerent nations, impose upon our government no 
obligation to make protest. 

I do not think, sir, that your arguments, and the precedents 

* A letter published in the New York Times, February i7, ipiS. 

I6 



cited by you to justify the failure of our country to protest ofificially 
against revolting deeds, carry conviction. 

Granting that the United States has no legal obligation to 
protest against Germany's violation of Belgium and other crimes 
against the rights of humanity committed by her, are you not 
begging the question? Does not the world expect from this country 
something more than a purely correct legal attitude? Are we 
going to ignore our moral obligations as champions of democracy? 
Most of us believe that the Allies are fighting for the cause of 
personal liberty throughout the world, and that this country is 
vitally interested in the outcome. Most of us believe that, should 
Prussian militarism triumph, this fearful struggle would have to 
be begun all over again, sooner or later, in which case it is very 
improbable that the United States could avoid taking an active 
part in it. 

The American nation is practically unanimous in condemning 
Prussian militarism and its methods, and through its magnificent 
generosity it has expressed warm sympathy for its victims; but 
ofificially America has not spoken a word. On the contrary, a con- 
gratulatory birthday message was sent " in the name of the Amer- 
ican people " by the President of the United States to the German 
Emperor. At the first indication, however, that England might be 
exceeding her rights in the handling of ships carrying American 
cargoes and involving, therefore, monetary consideration, official 
protest was quickly formulated, an action calculated to cause se- 
rious embarrassment to the Allies and to render their titanic task 
still more difficult. 

No one in his senses can believe for a moment that England 
intends to interfere with the commerce and other interests of this 
country. The good-will of the United States is of much importance 
to her in the present crisis, and she is undoubtedly anxious to gain 
and retain it. If there are some who believe that her desire for our 
sympathy is not prompted by genuine friendship for the people 
of the United States, let them ascribe it to some other motives, but 
let them also realize the utter foolishness of assuming the existence 
of any unfriendly intention oil the part of England toward this 
country. 

Will it be contended that the maintenance of an attitude 
of strict neutrality by this nation prohibits the placing on record 
of her abhorrence of acts violating sacred rights of nations and of 
humanity? And, after all, this punctilious neutrality has been of no 
avail. The German sympathizers in this country are still dis- 

17 



satisfied. Indeed, they are in an ugly mood and threaten to take 
the nation by the throat and teach her a lesson. 

Although deeply appreciative of the moral support of the 
American people, is it surprising that our English friends should 
experience that tightening of the heart which comes from the 
hesitating attitude of a friend at a crucial moment in one's existence? 

Cambridge, Mass., February 15, 1915. 



A VIEW OF THE OUTCOME.* 

In your issue of February 25 you ask editorially, " Is Germany 
Winning? " the question being prompted by some remarks of Rear- 
Admiral Francis T. Bowles recently printed in the newspapers. 
Admiral Bowles's views do not appear to constitute a safe founda- 
tion upon which to rest the belief that the Germans will be victori- 
ous when it is considered that they are opposed by the opinion 
of the great majority of intelligent and neutral observers. Nor 
are such views supported by what the Germans have so far ac- 
complished, and still less by what the conditions are likely to be as 
time passes. 

Granting Germany's marvelous military organization and her 
vast supplies of men and ammunitions, is it not obvious that the 
Allies' resources are still greater and that they are increasing at a 
pace that Germany cannot possibly follow? As for Germany's 
successes to date, they point to ultimate defeat rather than to 
victory. In the West she has utterly failed to accomplish what was 
so essential to her final success. Her quick advance toward Paris 
at the beginning of the war was made possible primarily because 
of the inability of the French to mobilize as fast as their enemy and 
because, despite many warnings, the French doubted that Germany 
would commit so great an international crime as the violation 
of Belgium and, in consequence, massed their troops at their eastern 
frontier. As soon, however, as sufificient forces could be brought 
together, and with the assistance of a handful of English troops, the 
advance was turned into a disastrous retreat. 

The Germans were then numerically superior to the French, 
and better supplied with artillery. Is it reasonable to suppose that 
what the Germans were unable to perform under such favorable 
conditions can be done now when the numerical superiority of the 

* A letter published in the Boston Herald, March r, igiS- 



Allies is every day increasing? Is it conceivable that they will do 
in the spring with 1,000,000 English soldiers facing them what they 
could not do last August when England had less than 100,000 men 
at the firing line? For the last five months the Germans have 
lost ground in the West, slowly but steadily, and the reasonable 
assumption is that they will be unable to resist a pressure which is 
becoming every day more severe, and which must lead eventually to 
the evacuation of France and Belgium. In the East, Germany has 
won several victories over the Russians, but has not Russia twice 
invaded East Prussia? Have they not inflicted enormous losses on 
the Germans and severe defeats on the Austrian armies and on the 
Turks? Are they not occupying a large territory in Austria-Hun- 
gary? Has not Germany repeatedly failed in her attempts to reach 
Warsaw? Assuming, to favor the German side, that two Russians 
have been disabled to one German, this would entail a relatively 
much greater loss to the Germans, for at that rate their armies must 
in time be completely annihilated, while Russia would still have 
millions of men in the field. It is not to be believed that, with one 
half of her army detained in the West, Germany can possibly defeat 
Russia on Russian territory. 

As to shortage of food, ammunition, and money, is it not certain 
that the Allies can stand the strain longer than Germany? Unless 
Admiral Bowles has reason to suspect that Germany is now capable 
of developing means of attack which she has not so far been able to 
bring into play, his statements, which are apparently based on the 
industrial and military conditions he observed in Germany, do not 
carry conviction. Had he traveled likewise in France and England, 
his faith in the eventual success of Germany might have been 
shaken. 

If the above considerations, however, fail to convince one that 
the Allies will triumph over their foes, let it be remembered that this 
struggle is no longer between a dual or triple alliance on one side 
and a triple entente on the other; it is a struggle between the 
civilized world and Prussian militarism, which, through its violation 
of Belgium and its barbarous methods of warfare, is every day 
becoming more odious. Should the Allies be really in danger of 
being crushed, some of the neutral nations, at least, would come to 
their assistance. If they remain neutral now, it is because of their 
conviction that the Allies can deal successfully with the situation. 
That the world would tolerate a victory of Prussian militarism is 
unthinkable, and that Prussian militarism and its allies can defeat 
the whole world is also unthinkable. 

19 



As for Admiral Bowles's statement that the AUies, including 
England, " are ready to quit," who will believe him? 

Cambridge, February 26. 



AMERICA AND THE WAR. 
Arguments For and Against Intervention.* 

With remarkable unanimity the peoples of the neutral nations 
have expressed their horror at the violation of Belgium and at the 
barbarous methods of warfare of the German armies. When it 
comes to their respective governments making any official protest, 
however, or taking any part in the struggle, the pubUc opinion in 
those countries appears to be sharply divided. It cannot be argued 
that one side is more patriotic than the other; on the contrary, it 
must be assumed that both have the welfare and honor of their 
country equally at heart. Why, then, these opposite views? 

Obviously because of a different understanding as to the merits 
and meaning of the war and of the conditions likely to prevail in 
the world at its conclusion according as to whether one side or the 
other is victorious. 

Those who urge their government to take no official action 
whatsoever unless the interests of the nation are directly challenged 
contend that the quarrel between the belligerents does not concern 
their country; that they are not called upon to play the part of 
policemen among warring nations; that as bystanders they may 
witness the perpetration of a crime without any obligation on their 
part to interfere; that any interference might draw upon them the 
wrath of the villain and thus endanger their own peace ; that a purely 
sentimental protest on humanitarian grounds would be foolish and 
would do more harm than good ; that, while wishing for the success 
of the Allies, their country should not, officially, give them any 
assistance, even of a purely moral character, as, for instance, by 
protesting against Germany's deeds; that it would be better for 
them to permit a victory of Prussian militarism than to become 
involved in the war. Theirs is obviously the " safety first " point 
of view, but it may be asked pertinently whether the course they 
advocate is in reality the safest one to follow, even when all moral 
considerations are ignored and attention is given solely to the 
peace of the nation and its commercial welfare. 

* A letter published in the New York Times, April 4. ipiS- 
20 



The advocates of official intervention, if only of a sentimental 
kind, base their view on their conviction that a victory of Prussian 
militarism would be the greatest calamity that could befall western 
civilization, and that, should it come to pass, their country would 
suffer greatly; that they should enter the arena rather than to 
permit it; they contend that it is cowardly, and in the present 
instance shortsighted, to remain outwardly indifferent onlookers to 
a great tragedy by which an innocent nation is violated and tortured ; 
shortsighted because, if the ruffian is permitted to complete his 
task, the bystanders themselves may be his next victims; they 
believe that moral obligations cannot be utterly disregarded and 
a nation's conduct influenced only by selfish or pusillanimous 
considerations; that their country, on the contrary, should be 
willing to suffer pecuniary losses and other inconveniences as a 
very small contribution to the struggle for liberty and democracy 
throughout the world; that the Allies are at least entitled to an 
official assurance of sympathy for the justice of their cause; that 
moral support at least should be extended to them freely and un- 
grudgingly; that their task should not be made more difficult by 
official fault-finding with relatively unimportant incidents; they 
do not believe that the neutrality of their country should be carried 
to the point of abstaining, in face of revolting deeds, from any 
official word or act which might be construed by Germany as 
indicative of disapproval of her conduct, of sympathy for the cause 
of their opponents, or even of pity for their victims; against that 
kind of neutrality they rebel. 

As representative an exponent of civic virtues as Dr. Charles 
W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University, is one of 
those who hold that a Prussian victory should not be tolerated by 
the neutral nations. Referring to President Eliot's views. Professor 
Kuno Francke writes in an article contributed to The Fatherland : 

" Many of the sympathizers with Great Britain have gone so far 
in their blind partisanship as to become un-American. When a 
man like President Eliot openly declares that the United States 
could not allow Germany to vanquish the Allies, when the whole 
drift of his utterances proves that he considers loyalty to German 
ideals and sympathy with the German cause as incompatible with 
loyalty to America, this fact alone is sufficient to show that partisan- 
ship for the Allies tempts even recognized leaders of American public 
opinion into views contrary to American interests and American 
ideals." 

A newspaper expressing approval of Professor Francke's 

21 



views writes: "Turning reason's searchlight on the too English 
sympathies of many of our citizens, he shows them in their essence 
un-American." 

Another paper, in commending some remarks of Lord Bryce 
on the neutrality of the United States, expresses itself as follows: 

" Lord Bryce's statement in the London Chronicle on the posi- 
tion of the United States in reference to the war should put to shame 
those Americans who have been clamoring that we should ' do 
something ' about the violation of Belgium's neutrality and 
flagrant breaches of recognized rules of war." 

Such assertions should be vigorously challenged. By what 
perverted mental process can it be argued that in being guided by 
considerations of a high moral order and by unselfish and devoted 
love for one's country in making up one's mind on a question of 
supreme importance, and then to express one's views fearlessly, is 
un-American and shameful? Is it not, on the contrary, in keeping 
with the dictates of true Americanism? These men believe, with 
the rest of mankind, exclusive of Germany and her allies, that the 
crucifixion of Belgium is a blot on the history of Germany that 
time even will not efface; but they believe also that the attitude 
of the neutral nations which, like Pontius Pilate, wash their hands 
of the criminal deed, is a blot on civilization itself. 

Cambridge, March ii, 191 5. 



THE ISSUE OF THE WAR.* 

While the great majority of neutral observers of the present war 
believe that the Allies will eventually win, many statements have 
recently appeared in the newspapers pointing to a German victory. 
We are told that Germany still possesses great aggressive power and 
large stores of food and ammunition ; that she is building hundreds of 
submarines and hundreds of Zeppelins to be used in the conquest 
of England; that millions of men are still to be sent to the front; 
that Russia will soon be beaten, or that she will betray her allies and 
conclude a separate peace; that the defeat of France will promptly 
follow, and that England, deprived of the assistance of her allies, 
will in turn succumb. 

A little reflection suffices to show the unsoundness of these 

* A letter published in the New York Sun, April 13, 19 1 5- 
22 



arguments and, in some instances, their fantastic character. That 
the resources of the AlHes in money, food, and ammunition are 
vastly superior to those of Germany, Austria, and Turkey is a fact 
that cannot be reasonably refuted. As for men, it has been declared 
that Germany could still send 14,000,000 against her enemies. Let 
us assume, for the sake of argument, that it is a possible thing for a 
country to prepare for actual warfare twenty per cent, of its entire 
population. Germany, Austria, and Turkey have a total population 
of some 139,000,000, while England, France, Russia, and Servia have 
a combined population of 248,000,000. If Germany can send to the 
battlefield twenty per cent, of her population, so can the other 
nations. It is not to be argued that France, England, and Russia 
are not ready to make as great sacrifices as their enemies, or that 
they lack the will or means to mobilize as large a proportion of their 
population. They may not be able to do it as quickly, but that they 
could eventually do it is not to be doubted. There would, then, be 
27,000,000 men on the Teutonic side against 49,000,000 on the side 
of the Allies. Of course, these figures are absurd ; they are given here 
solely to show that there is little comfort for German sympathizers 
in this kind of talk. 

And so it is with the hundreds of Zeppelins and of submarines 
said to be in process of construction. Leaving the realms of fancy, 
it will be realized that the best Germany will probably be able to do 
will be to manufacture these implements fast enough to replace 
those destroyed. Nor is there any reason to anticipate that her 
warfare in this direction will be in the future more effective than 
it has been in the past. If Germany had it in her power to use her 
Zeppelins and submarines so as to strike telling blows at her enemies, 
who would believe for an instant that she would have been con- 
tented these eight months with the sinking of a few merchant ships 
and the killing of a few women and children? Ships will continue to 
be torpedoed from time to time, but the British fleet will not be 
destroyed; more women and children will undoubtedly be murdered, 
but neither England nor France will be laid bare by the bombs 
of the German Zeppelins. 

In regard to Russia's early defeat, the assertion is absolutely 
without support, while the contention that she is to prove traitor 
and abandon her allies is so obviously part of the German propa- 
ganda intended to create distrust and discord among the Allies as 
hardly to deserve consideration. 

The facts are that Germany probably has in the East some 
2,000,000 men facing three or four million Russians, and that 

23 



in the West she has likewise some 2,000,000 soldiers opposed by 
3,000,000 Frenchmen and 1,000,000 Belgians and British, the latter 
soon to be strongly reenforced. It may be reasonably assumed that 
all belligerent countries will be able for some time to come to fill the 
gaps in their armies as fast as they occur, but in time the supply 
must become exhausted, when, assuming equal losses on both sides, 
the German armies must of necessity be annihilated, while millions 
of Allies would still remain in the field ; and it seems inevitable that 
the supply of new recruits must give out in Germany before the 
Allies have exhausted theirs. 

No mention is here made of the armies of Austria and of Turkey 
because additional available millions of Russian troops will un- 
doubtedly be able to complete the defeat of these half -beaten armies. 

Those to whom these facts are unwelcome will find little comfort 
in the hope that the Germans will achieve victory in the face of these 
great odds because of greater strategic skill, greater bravery, or 
what not, seeing that such hope would have no foundation. The 
days of a possible theatrical drive to Paris, followed by a rush to 
Petrograd, have passed. The German forces are divided between 
the East and the West, and divided they must remain to the end of 
the war. Admitting that the combined forces of Germany and 
Austria could crush Russia on the one hand, or England and 
France on the other, divided the task is beyond their power. 

As for the neutral nations, if some of them cease to be neutral , 
as some probably will, it is almost certain that they will join the 
ranks of the Allies. 

It may appear presumptuous for one who is not a military 
expert to venture a prediction as to the outcome of the European 
struggle, but the statements of military specialists have been so wild 
or so absolutely non-committal as to be of little assistance to laymen, 
and it seems permissible to express an opinion based on common 
sense and on the rational belief that a coalition of 248,000,000 people 
with greater resources, the command of the sea, equal strategic 
skills equal courage, and equal determination cannot be defeated 
by a coalition of 139,000,000 people. 

It should also be borne in mind that the Allies have the hearty 
moral support of practically all the neutral nations, and the great 
importance of that " asset " is not to be overlooked. The soldiers of 
the Allies are inspired by the knowledge that their victory will be 
acclaimed with rejoicing by the neutral nations and that they will be 
hailed as the liberators of the world from the odious Teutonic 
menace. The German soldiers, on the contrary, must fight with 

24 



the courage of desperation while conscious that if they win they will 
have to live surrounded by nations in which their conduct has 
inspired horror, and which by brute force only can be prevented from 
rising against them, a vision of victory hardly less disheartening 
than that of defeat. 

In view of the above considerations, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that, barring dissensions among the Allies, or a premature 
peace caused by weariness of war, if the Allies decide to play the 
terrible game to its bitter end their eventual and complete victory 
is practically a mathematical certainty. 

Cambridge, Mass., April ii. 



ITALY'S DUTY.* 



In a recently published letter, Prof. John W. Burgess proves 
his proficiency in German kultur and his ability to use the methods 
peculiar to German mentality, but, like other German apologists, he 
utterly fails to prove his contentions. 

Professor Burgess claims that the dictates of honor compel 
Italy to take sides in this war with her former allies, Germany and 
Austria; that to cast her lot with Great Britain, France, and Russia 
" would be a deed of dishonor so deep and damning," he writes, that 
he will never be able to persuade himself that she will do it until 
it is actually done. For her to join the Allies, we are further told, 
would be " infamy." 

All this is obviously German " mentalism " pure and simple, if 
I may be permitted to coin the word. What are the facts? For 
many years an alliance has existed between Germany, Austria, and 
Italy by which Italy was bound to come to the assistance of her 
allies in the event of the latter being attacked. In the summer 
of 1914 Germany and Austria, without consulting Italy, forced upon 
the world the most aggressive, brutal, and unjust of wars. Italy 
did not deviate from the " path of honor," nor did she commit an 
infamy in refusing to help Germany and Austria in their odious 
designs. Since then Prussian militarism has been stripped of all 
vestiges of disguise and now stands before the world in its hideous 
nakedness, an object of universal horror. In refusing to reconsider 
her decision Italy is not deviating from the path of honor, nor would 
she commit an infamy should she join the Allies. Indeed, a few 

* Not previously published. 
25 



more incidents like the sinking of the Falaha and it will be un- 
justifiable for any nation not to help bringing the guilty ones to 
terms. 

When our associates become outlaws, it is not following the 
path of honor to remain in their company, nor is it infamy to help 
others in putting an end to their criminal deeds. 

Passing to purely selfish considerations, by which, according 
to Professor Burgess, Italy should also be guided, we are told that 
her interests clearly demand that she should join her old allies. 
Even the unkuUured may see that in the event of a German 
victory Italy might gain by being on her side, but what if the Allies 
should win? And it is quite possible that Italy believes with others 
that victory for the Allies will be the probable outcome of the 
struggle. 

Professor Burgess ventures the opinion that if a Cavour were 
guiding the destinies of Italy that country would cast her fortunes 
with the Teutonic peoples. Few students of Italy, and especially 
of the life of her great statesman, will, I believe, share Professor 
Burgess' view. 
Cambridge, Mass., April 12, 1915. 



PRUSSIAN MILITARISM AND BRITISH NAVALISM.* 

In a widely published letter to Ernest Ludwig, Consul for 
Austria-Hungary, Count Albert Apponyi, at one time Hungarian 
Minister of Education, joins the ranks of the German apologists 
in an attempt to convince the American people that they misplaced 
their sympathy in taking sides with the Allies. The Count confesses 
" that a feeling of irritation against the Great Republic spreads both 
in Austria as well as Germany," and he fears that the United States 
has " irretrievably lost the confidence of one belligerent party." 
" What sort of spell," he asks, " has been cast upon the American 
mind that it should fail to perceive matters so obvious, so clear? " 
The war has been forced upon Germany and her allies " by the 
sacred duty of self-defense against wanton aggression." 

As was the case with other champions of the German cause, 
Count Apponyi's plea will serve only to strengthen the belief of the 
American people that they were right in their condemnation of 
Germany's aims and methods. When will the apologists for in- 

* A letter published in The Nation, April 29, 1915. 
26 



famous deeds realize that Prussian militarism has been stripped of 
every vestige of disguise it ever wore, and that most of the stripping 
has been done by its very defenders; that it now stands before the 
world in its hideous nakedness, and that any attempt at robing it 
again in its tattered clothes will be futile? 

Count Apponyi would have the world believe that it stands in 
greater danger from what he chooses to call " English navalism " 
than from Prussian militarism. Unfortunately for the Count's 
appeal, the world knows what Prussian militarism stands for, 
what it is capable of doing, and what it would undoubtedly do 
should it be victorious in the war. As for England's great strength 
on the sea, which is so essential to her very existence, the world may 
thank the gods for it, since it would otherwise be at the mercy of 
German Kultur. 

Between English navalism and German militarism, the world 
does not hesitate. It knows the latter to be malignant, while be- 
lieving the danger of the former to exist only in Teutonic minds. 

Cambridge, Mass., April i6. 



27 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




GERMANY AND THE EUROPL^f, "^Z. ^^?^^ * 

By Albert Sauveur. 

A brief consideration of Germany's claims under the following 
captions: Claim I, Germany was not the aggressor; Claim II, 
French aggression; Claim III, English aggression; Claim IV, 
Russian aggression; Claim V, Germany is fighting to protect 
Europe from Slavic domination; Claim VI, Germany is fighting 
for civilization; Claim VII, The invasion of Belgium by Germany 
was justifiable; Claim VIII, The methods used by the Germans 
in conducting the war are justifiable. 



The proceeds from the sale of this pamphlet are contributed to 
the funds being raised for the Belgium refugees. 



Copies may be obtained from the author, Cambridge, Mass., or 
from the Harvard Co-operative Society, Harvard Square, Cam- 
bridge, Mass. Price, 35 cents. 



Extract from a letter of the Belgian minister at Washington, 
dated January 27, 1915 (reproduced by permission of M. Havenith) : 

" I have read with the greatest interest your publication on 
' Germany and the European War ' which you forwarded to me 
with your letter of the twenty-fourth of this month. 

" Permit me to offer you my sincere congratulations on this 
clear, precise, and keen exposition of German diplomacy. 

" I should be happy to help distribute it. I believe that this 
pamphlet should not only be sold for charitable purposes, but ought 
to be sent free, in large quantities, all over the United States. I 
am quite ready to send it, with my recommendation, to all the 
Belgian consuls, to professors, colleges, clubs, and the clergy, and, 
in short, to give it a wide circulation." 

(Signed) The Belgian Minister. 
(E. Havenith.) 

This pamphlet has been translated into French and published 
with an introduction by Henri Le Chatelier, member of the 
Academie des Sciences. Copies of the French translation may be 
obtained from Bloud et Gay, 7 Place Saint-Sulpice, Paris. Price, 
15 cents. 

28 

SAMUEL USHER 
BOSTON 



